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Operation of Joint Wills in Texas
By BERTEL M. SPARKS of Durham, N. C.
In 1775 Lord Mansfield declared, "Now
there cannot be a joint will.' ' The state-
ment was offered as a self-evident truism'
and such it was. And it is no less true now
than it was then. By its very nature a will
is a one-party instrument having to do
with the winding up or settling of an in-
dividual's affairs at death. As such it is
impossible for a will, even when jointly
executed by two or more persons, to have
a joint operation like a deed or contract
executed by joint grantors or obligors.
But in spite of the self-evident nature of
Lord Mansfield's dictum, the term "joint
will" has become rather thoroughly em-
bedded in Anglo-American legal literature
and there appears no likelihood that it is
going to disappear. In view of all this, it
is the purpose of the present paper to
ascertain the meaning of that term as it
is generally used and to further inquire
into whether or not it has acquired any
peculiar or unique meaning in the law of
Texas.
The General View
A satisfactory functional definition of a
"joint will" is that it is a term used to
describe the separate wills of two or more
persons expressed in a single writing
which is executed by each of them. And
the point worthy of special emphasis in
this connection is that there are separate
wills in spite of the single writing. The
writing is often phrased in such language
as "This is our will .... we dispose of our
property," and similar expressions. Thus
it is joint in form but it can never be
joint in operation. Neither does the fact
that the separate wills are expressed in
one writing give them any peculiar or
unique character. They are still separate
wills and the validity of the execution as
to each maker must be separately consid-
ered.3 When the first maker dies, the docu-
ment is offered for probate as his will.
Whether or not it is admitted to probate
at that time has no bearing on its validity
as the will of the survivor ' nor does it af-
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fect the right of the survivor to subse-
quently revoke the will.' Upon the death
of the survivor the same document may
be offered for probate as the survivor's
will. At that time the question to be de-
cided is whether or not the writing was
properly executed by the survivor, and, if
it was, whether it has been revoked. In
the determination of these questions, the
admission or non-admission of the docu-
ment to probate as the will of the first
maker to die is irrelevant. Even if the
parties die simultaneously and leave no
property except that which is jointly
owned, there are still separate estates to
be administered and the claims against
each must be separately considered.
A concept that is at least as old, and
probably older, than the joint will is that
of a contract to make a will, or, more
accurately stated, a contract for the pas-
sage of property at death.' By the terms
of such contracts the promisor becomes
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obligated to provide for a particular testa-
mentary disposition. If he dies without
having made such a provision, he will be
in breach of contract and his estate will
be subject to the same kind of contractual
liability as would be the case if he had
died in breach of some other, contract. His
last will should be admitted to probate
without regard to whether it is in com-
pliance with the contract or is inconsistent
with it.7 The obligation to the promisee
will be a claim against the estate and will
take priority over the claims of benefi-
ciaries of an inconsistent will. Enforce-
ment of the contract has no direct bearing
upon the will but might have the effect of
so removing the assets from the estate
that there will be nothing left upon which
the will can operate. The result is the same
as any other case where a testator's liabil-
ties equal or exceed his assets.'
But it is altogether possible that the will
contracted for might be a joint will, that
is to say, it might be a contract whereby
each of two parties bind themselves to
execute a joint writing as the separate
wills of each of them. In such a case it is
also possible that the terms of the contract
itself might be expressed on the face of
the will. If this is done, the result is three
independent legal documents, two wills
and one contract, expressed in a single
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writing. The presence of the single writ-
ing does not alter the fact that three sep-
arate legal relationships are involved.
When the first party dies, the document
may be offered for probate as his will, and,
if his proper execution is shown and if
there is no showing that he has subse-
quently revoked, the instrument should be
admitted as his will. If perchance he ex-
ecuted a subsequent revoking will, even
without notice to his joint maker, the joint
will must be denied probate and the sub-
sequent will admitted. In such a case the
surviving joint maker as promisee of the
contract or the third party beneficiary if
there is one may bring an action on the
contract. When the surviving joint maker
dies, the writing may be offered for pro-
bate as his will. If it is found that his will
was not properly executed or if he has
subsequently revoked, probate will be de-
nied and his entire estate will be liable for
his breach of contract.
The presence of three legal relation-
ships arising out of one document has led
many writers on the subject to assume
that all three must stand or fall together,
that the physical unity necessitates a unity
of legal effect. Once that line of reasoning
is accepted, it is but a short step to the
conclusion that somehow the contract is
a necessary element of the joint will or
that the joint will as such has a legal sig-
nificance that sets it apart from an indi-
vidual will. It is often said that joint wills
are irrevocable. It is even more often
said that joint wills are revocable so
long as both parties are alive but that
if one party dies with the will in effect,
the other cannot thereafter revoke.
There is no rational foundation for either
statement so long as it is recognized
that wills are creatures of statute and
that the statute provides for their re-
vocation but makes no provision for
their irrevocability. Assertions of the kind
referred to are usually made without any
inquiry into whether or not any evidence
of a contract has been presented and with-
out regard to whether the instrument con-
cerned includes any contractual language.
They seem to be based on the assumption
that the wills themselves by virtue of their
reciprocal testamentary provisions, are
sufficient evidence of the contract. But
that assumption is without foundation un-
less it is also assumed that the interests
of husbands and wives are so adverse to
(Continued on Page 314)
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each other that their testamentary wishes
are in the nature of things so antagonistic
that it is virtually impossible for them to
make similar testamentary arrangements
without their having subjected themselves
to a binding legal obligation to do so. But
even if the contract did exist and the
statements concerning revocability were
intended to apply, not to joint wills, but to
contracts to make joint wills, they would
still be fallacious. A contract is never "re-
vocable" or subject to unilateral rescis-
sion, and in this respect a contract to
make a joint will is no different from any
other contract. If one party undertakes to
rescind, even while the other is living, the
attempted rescission will be ineffective
and the contract will be enforced.
Although a unilateral rescission of a
contract is impossible, the parties are free
to, get together and agree upon a rescission
any time they wish." As soon as one party
dies with the contract still in effect, rescis-
sion by the survivor is impossible. It is
impossible, not because it concerns a will,
and not because it concerns a joint will,
but because it is a simple contract which,
like all other contracts, cannot be rescind-
ed without the concurrence of both parties
to it. It is in this sense, and in this sense
only, that it may be said that the contrac-
tual obligation to make joint wills may be
terminated while both parties are alive
but cannot be terminated by the survivor
after one of them has died. A more accu-
rate way of putting it would be that the
wills are always revocable, and that the
contract is never revocable but may be
rescinded provided both, not just one, of
the parties so agree.
The Texas View
But the above analysis. of the general
view does not seem to be applicable in
Texas where there is an unusual tendency
to fuse the wills and the contract into a
single concept. The position of the Texas
court is well illustrated by a decision of
the Texarkana Court of Civil Appeals in
1920." Two sisters executed a joint will
(that is to say, a joint writing as their
separate wills) by which the first of them
to die gave all her property to the survivor
for life and further provided for a gift
over of the property of both upon the
death of the survivor. One sister died and
the will was admitted to probate as her
will and her estate was distributed to the
surviving sister. Thereafter the survivor
executed a new will revoking the joint will
and providing for a different disposition.
Upon the survivor's death the joint will
was admitted to probate as her last legal
will. No effort was made to explain how
this could be harmonized with the statu-
tory provisions for the execution and rev-
ocation of wills." It would seem that the
better view, and the view followed by a
clear majority of the American courts,
would have been to admit the last validly
executed will to probate and then, in a
separate proceeding, inquire into whether
or not the beneficiaries of the joint will
had any contractual claim against the es-
tate of the survivor."
But failure to explain why it ignored
the Texas Wills Act was not the only
shortcoming of the Texarkana court. It
failed to give any satisfactory explanation
of what gave the beneficiaries of the re-
voked joint will any claim of any kind
against the decedent's estate. In a curious
statement that sounds both in contract
and in estoppel without a contract, the
court declared: "The fact that the will was
executed in that form conclusively evi-
dences an agreement by the participants
to do what was actually done by them. The
will became irrevocable after the death of
one, not because it was made in pursuance
of a previous contract, but because the
survivor, after ratifying and accepting the
benefits conferred, became estopped to re-
pudiate the will."'" If the court intended to
rest its decision upon a contract, which
appears at least doubtful, it seemed to
assume that the existence of the joint will
was sufficient evidence of the contract.
Such a position is clearly inconsistent with
sound reason as well as against the clear
weight of authority outside of Texas."
The presence of a joint will is evidence
that the parties had talked the matter
over and had arrived at an understanding
concerning their respective testamentary
dispositions. Discussions and understand-
ings of this kind between persons of close
affinities, sisters in this case, are not un-
usual and should not be regarded as any
indication of an intent to make a binding
contract.
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Reliance upon estoppel in this connec-
tion is even more difficult to justify than
reliance upon contract. If a contract could
be proved, the denial of the privilege of
rescission (of the contract) to the sur-
vivor could be based on orthodox contract
law that one party cannot rescind without
the consent of the other. Admission of an
inconsistent will to probate would not de-
prive the promisee of his contractual rem-
edy. If it is admitted that no contract ex-
ists, it is difficult to find any basis for an
obligation upon the survivor that would
prevent her from making any disposition
of her property that she chose. The posi-
tion of the Texarkana court tends toward
the untenable doctrine that the mere ex-
istence of reciprocal testamentary provi-
sions constitutes a sufficient basis for re-
liance by each testator on a belief that the
other will not change his will, that upon
the death of either the other is estopped
from altering his testamentary inten-
tions."
Whatever might be its rationalization,
the case discussed above held that where
two parties execute a joint will by which
the first to die gives the survivor his or
her entire estate for life and both give
their entire property at the death of the
survivor to a third person, as soon as one
party has died and the other has claimed
the benefits under the will, the survivor
is under an enforceable obligation not to
alter his testamentary plans. Subsequent
Texas cases have both clarified and ex-
panded this position but they have not
abandoned it. And while some uncertainty
as to the theory remains, it appears that
the tendency is away from reliance upon
estoppel and toward reliance upon con-
tract as well as away from probate rem-
edies and toward contractual remedies. 7
It has also become clear that whether the
surviving joint maker is given a life estate
or a fee simple is immaterial and that his
contractual obligation does not depend up-
on his accepting the benefits of the will of
the first to die. Both of these points were
applied in Weidner v. Crowther18 where a
joint will executed by a husband and wife
as joint makers gave the survivor of them
a fee and provided for a gift over of "all
our property" at the death of the survivor.
The survivor's renunciation and subse-
quent execution of an inconsistent will did
not deprive the beneficiaries of the gift
over of their claim to "all our property."
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In reaching its decision the court made it
rather clear that it was relying upon the
presence of a contract rather than any
doctrine of estoppel when it declared, "At
the heart of a mutual will lies a contract
of the parties. It would be manifestly un-
just to permit the surviving party to the
contract to disavow it and its obligations,
as those obligations are incorporated in
their will. . . ."" The importance of the
words "as those obligations are incorpo-
rated in their will" as used in this connec-
tion has been emphasized by subsequent
developments. Standing alone these words
would seem to indicate that in the absence
of any words of contract on the face of
the joint will, the will would not be con-
sidered evidence of an enforceable obliga-
tion. Such is not the case. The words ap-
parently mean nothing more than that the
testamentary provisions of the will must
be construed and interpreted to ascertain
specifically what was promised. The only
element essential to establish that some-
thing was promised is that there be ex-
press words or gift to take effect upon the
death of the survivor without regard to
who the survivor might be. This was suf-
ficient proof of a contract in the Weidner
case. It is out of harmony with the law
generally"0 but it appears to be the law in
Texas. And the fact that the surviving
joint maker is given broad or even unlim-
ited power of inter vivos disposition does
not defeat the presumption that the pro-
vision in the joint will for a gift over of
what remains at the survivor's death is
the result of an enforceable contract that
it be there. 1 But the inter vivos power
might be stated in such broad terms that
it will enable the surviving joint maker to
effectively defeat the beneficiaries of the
gift over by making a complete inter vivos
disposition, and, if the power is sufficient-
ly broad, the fact that it is exercised in
bad faith will make no difference."
Once it is assumed that the provision
for a gift over upon the death of the sur-
viving party to a joint will is ipso facto
evidence that it is the fruit of a contract
between the joint makers, it is inevitable
that the testamentary provision itself
must be construed in order to ascertain
the subject matter of the contract. In the
Weidner case the provision was for a gift
over of "all our property" and this was
held to impose a contractual obligation
upon the survivor to leave all his property,
including property acquired subsequent to
the death of the first maker to die, in ac-
cordance with the joint will. But for this
purpose a gift of "all our property" is not
necessarily synonymous with a gift of a
residue or remaining part. In Kirk v.
Beard" two brothers who owned certain
property as tenants in common each ex-
ecuted a will giving the other his undi-
vided share of the commonly-held proper-
ty and leaving the residue to certain named
nieces, the two groups of nieces being
identical. Upon the death of the first
brother to die his will was admitted to
probate and his estate was distributed ac-
cordingly. Upon the death of the surviving
brother the nieces claimed his entire es-
tate under an alleged contract between the
two brothers. Certain extrinsic evidence
of the contract was introduced but it was
of a somewhat nebulous character and
was apparently not relied upon by the
court. The court considered the wills
themselves sufficient to prove a contract
and then construed the contract as not in-
cluding the commonly held property, thus
leaving the surviving brother free to make
a different disposition of that part of his
estate.
It should be noted that the Kirk case
involved, not a joint will, but two sep-
arate writings having reciprocal provi-
sions and being in such form as to indicate
on their faces that they were executed in
conjunction with each other. Such wills
are usually referred to as "mutual wills."
The court apparently assumed that they
should not be distinguished from joint
wills so far as their tendency to prove the
existence of a contract is concerned.
There is scarcely any end to the unusual
construction problems created by reliance
upon either joint wills or mutual wills as
evidence of a contract when no contractual
language is used. It necessitates the ex-
amination of testamentary language to as-
certain the terms of a contract no part of
which was ever stated expressly in any
form. In Murphy v. Slaton5 a husband and
wife executed a joint will leaving their
respective estates to the survivor of them
for life and providing that upon the death
of the survivor the "estate then remain-
ing" was to be disposed of in a certain
manner. The husband died first and the
will was admitted to probate as his will.
Thereafter the wife executed codicils pur-
porting to make a different disposition. It
was held that the joint will was sufficient
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evidence of a contract which applied to
all property, whether separate or commu-
nity, held by either party at the time of
the husband's death but did not apply to
any subsequently acquired property of the
wife. Under this ruling the wife's after
acquired property was distributed in ac-
cordance with the codicils and all other
property distributed to the beneficiaries
of the joint will. The court gave no indi-
cation of what disposition would have
been made of the after acquired property
if no codicils had been executed. At least
two possibilities present themselves for
consideration. It could have passed under
the joint will as part of the wife's "estate
then remaining," which would have been
proper if the phrase "estate then remain-
ing" had been given its normal and nat-
ural testamentary meaning, or it could
have passed as intestate property, which
would have been the necessary result if
the quoted phrase had been given the same
meaning in its testamentary capacity as
the court attributed to it in its contractual
capacity. The Fort Worth Court of Civil
Appeals has held in a similar case that it
should have passed under the joint will."
Of course, if a joint will makes no provi-
sion for any kind of gift over at the death
of the surviving joint maker, it is not evi-
dence of any kind of contract concerning
the survivor's estate." The result reached
in the Fort Worth case is probably the
proper one but it does create something of
a paradox to hold that a given phrase
used only one time on one piece of paper
identifies one item of property for testa-
mentary purposes and an entirely differ-
ent item of property for contractual pur-
poses. It is submitted that the error lies
in the mistaken assumption of the Texas
courts that the writing had any contrac-
tual purpose in the first place.
The arbitrariness of the Texas position
is illustrated by the holding in Graser v.
Graser, a holding that has since been
followed in an almost identical case by
the Dallas Court of Civil Appeals." A
writing purporting to be the joint will of
a husband and wife was entirely in the
handwriting of the husband, was signed
by both husband and wife, and was also
signed by a third person. It had no attes-
tation clause. The husband died first and
the instrument was admitted to probate
as his holographic will. Upon the death of
the wife the writing was offered for pro-
bate as her will but probate was denied
because it was not properly attested. No
appeal was taken from this denial of pro-
bate but the would-be beneficiaries of the
ill-starred document brought action to es-
tablish their claim as third party bene-
ficiaries of a contract between husband
and wife. The writing was offered as evi-
deiice of the contract but relief was denied
on the rather peculiar theory that it could
not be evidence of a contract unless it was
validly executed as the will of both parties
to it. The reasoning back of this conclu-
sion is difficult to comprehend. Although
the document was ineffective as the will
of the wife, it was signed by her as well
as by her husband, and each of them in-
tended it to be their respective wills. Its
being signed by attesting witnesses (al-
though necessary to its validity as a will)
could not have added anything to its value
as evidence that there was also a contract.
The court's conclusion seemed to rest in
part at least upon the notion that unless
the writing was properly executed as a
will by both parties it would show on its
face that there was a failure of considera-
tion, in which case there could be no con-
tract. But this overlooks the fact that the
consideration in most cases of this kind
consists of the mutual promises to make
wills."° If the writing signed by both par-
ties did not evidence such mutual prom-
ises, how could the signing of attesting
witnesses be of any help?
A question involved but apparently not
effectively presented in the Graser case is
that of whether or not one of two. joint
makers can serve as an attesting witness
to the will of the, other and the further
question of whether or not he automatical-
ly becomes, such a witness when he signs
as a joint maker. As to the first question,
there appears no logical reason why one
joint maker could not so act. The problem
might be that it would invalidate the gift
to that witness but it should not affect the
validity of the remaining portions of the
will." The second question raises problems
concerning order of signing, whether or
not the joint maker intended to become a
witness, whether there was publication,
request by the testator, etc. All these prob-
lems were considered satisfied and a joint
maker's signature upheld as being that of
an attesting witness by a California
court. " In the Graser case no appeal was
taken from the denial of probate by the
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probate court, and the Supreme Court in-
dicated that if an appeal had been taken,
the decree denying probate would have
been upheld.3 But there was nothing in
the Supreme Court's opinion to indicate
that the point had been argued; therefore,
the question might be considered an open
one. The cases rejecting efforts to cure
defective execution by attaching a subse-
quently executed self-proving affidavit
signed by the appropriate number of wit-
nesses" would not be in point.
The Statute of Frauds
A contract to make a will, whether it
be for a joint will, an individual will, or
separate wills, is a contract for the trans-
fer of property at death. As such it is sub-
ject to the same Statute of Frauds prob-
lems as any other kind of contract for a
property transfer. The fact that it can-
not be performed until the death of the
promisor does not bring it within the
Statute of Frauds as a contract not to be
performed within a year since there is a
possibility of its being performed within
that time." On the same theory an agree-
ment to render personal services to the
promisor for his life is not a promise not
to be performed within a year. But an
agreement to render personal services for
a designated number of years, if more
than one, is within the ban of the Stat-
ute." And if the subject matter is real
estate, the contract is within the Statute
of Frauds provision covering a "contract
for the sale of lands.""3 If the subject
matter is personalty, it is within the stat-
utory provision concerning contracts for
the sale of personal property of more
than a certain amount." However, since
part payment is as effective as a writing
to satisfy the Statute of Frauds require-
ment concerning contracts for the sale of
goods and since in the usual contract-to-
make-a-will case the promisee has ren-
dered full performance by the time action
is brought, the Statute is usually satis-
fied."
Contracts to make wills involve con-
tracts for entire estates or for fractional
parts of estates more often than they do
either specific personalty or specific real-
ty. In such cases if the estate consists
entirely of personalty, there is usually no
problem for the reason given above. If
any part of the estate is realty, the con-
tract is likely to be held indivisible and
therefore entirely within the ban of the
statute."
In all the instances noted above the
Statute of Frauds problems are no differ-
ent from what they would have been
if a contract for a inter vivos prop-
erty transfer rather than a contract
to make a will had been involved. For
this purpose there is nothing peculiar
or unique about the fact that the transfer
contemplated is to take place by will. Here
as elsewhere the cases dealing with ques-
tions of part performance tend to divide
themselves into two categories. First,
there are those that require a type of per-
formance that is unequivocally referable
to the contract, or in the words of Judge
Cardozo, the acts of performance them-
selves must "supply the framework of the
promise.""2 Second, there are cases plac-
ing emphasis upon what is called the
"hardship" or "virtual fraud" of the
promisee."
In case of a contract to make a will
the promisee is usually not entitled to
possession and therefore not in a position
to make valuable improvements or do oth-
er acts upon the property prior to the
death of the promisor; therefore, if the
unequivocally referable test is strictly ad-
hered to, the part performance rendered
will usually be insufficient to give relief
against the Statute. " This position was
taken in 1921 in Texas in the case of
Hooks v. Bridgewater" and was reaf-
firmed in 1937." In the Hooks case an
oral contract was entered into whereby
a parent released custody of a child to
a promisor who agreed to rear the child
and to leave his entire estate to the child
at his death. Both parent and child 7 fully
performed their part of the bargain but
the promisor died without leaving the
promised will. Enforcement of the oral
contract was refused on the ground that
there had not been sufficient part perform-
ance to remove the case from the opera-
tion of the Statute of Frauds. The court
declared that in order to justify such re-
lief there must be payment of considera-
tion, possession, and valuable improve-
ments. "
If the Texas court had been favorably
disposed toward the "hardship" or "vir-
tual fraud" doctrine, a different result
might have been reached. Courts taking
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this position have recognized that filial
devotion, society and companionship, care,
nursing, or other personal service might
be valuable consideration but incapable
of monetary valuation and therefore in-
capable of being recovered in quantum
meruit. This has been accepted as ground
for granting relief against the Statute
of Frauds, and enforcing oral contracts
to devise." The Texas court considered
but expressly rejected this position." The
court did indicate, however, that the oral
contract would have been enforced if fail-
ure to do so would have perpetrated "an
actual fraud as distinguished from a mere
wrong. ' ' Then in 1961 in Kirk v. Beard,1
2
while purporting to follow the Hooks
case, the court seized upon the earlier
dictum to enforce a contract under cir-
cumstances which might amount to an ac-
ceptance of the "virtual fraud" or "hard-
ship" doctrine. Two brothers had exe-
cuted their separate wills devising certain
property to each other with their remain-
ing property going to third persons. One
brother died with his will in effect and
his property was distributed in accord-
ance with the will. Upon the death of the
surviving brother the third persons, as
third party beneficiaries, brought action
to enforce an alleged contract between the
two brothers. In upholding the contract
against a plea of the Statute of Frauds,
the court apparently believed it was
merely applying the fraud exception re-
ferred to in the Hooks case. However, no
actual fraud was shown and all that could
have been meant by the term "fraud" in
this connection was that the death of one
party to the contract with his will in effect
constituted such an irretrievable change of
position that it would be unconscionable
to permit the Statute of Frauds to be used
to enable the survivor to avoid his prom-
ised performance. If this is the doctrine
of the case, Texas may be said to have
accepted the "hardship" or "virtual
fraud" theory and to have impliedly over-
ruled the Hooks case. But since the court
purported to be following Hooks, addi-
tional litigation will be necessary before
the position can be clarified.
The confusion presently existing is il-
lustrated by Haynes v. Henderson3 where
a husband and wife executed their sep-
arate wills by which each gave his or her
property to the other. Although not ex-
pressly indicated in the court's opinion,
it did not appear that there was any pro-
vision in either will for any alternative
beneficiary. The husband died first. His
will was admitted to probate and his es-
tate distributed accordingly. The wife
subsequently executed a new will and
upon her death an action was brought to
enforce an alleged oral contract between
the husband and wife by which it was
agreed that upon the death of the survivor
of them the property was to be divided
equally between the husband's relatives
and the wife's relatives. The Austin Court
of Civil Appeals held that recovery on the
contract was barred by the Statute of
Frauds but failed to even discuss the
question of part performance. A con-
curring justice did consider the matter
and took the position that the death of the
husband with his will in effect could not
be considered such performance as would
remove the case from the operation of the
Statute because it was not an act "un-
equivocally referable" to a contract."
This result would appear to be dictated
by the decision in Hooks v. Bridgewater.
A dissenting justice would have enforced
the contract on the ground that the hus-
band's death with his will in effect was
sufficient performance to justify relief
against the Statute of Frauds. This result
would seem to be the proper one under
the authority of Kirk v. Beard which was
cited in the dissenting opinion as being
"directly in point."" Thus the concurring
and dissenting justices took opposite posi-
tions but each appears to be correct under
the authorities upon which they respec-
tively relied.
If both Hooks v. Bridgewater and Kirk
v. Beard are to continue as authorities, a
rationalization for one or both of them
that is different from any that has been
offered by the court thus far must be
found. It is believed that such a difference
can be found by removing the Kirk case
from the part performance doctrine en-
tirely. Inquiry might be made as to when
or under what circumstances a will exe-
cuted pursuant to an oral contract may
serve as the written memorandum re-
quired to satisfy the Statute of Frauds.
A recital of the contract, including all its
essential terms, could be included in the
body of the will. If this is done, there
appears no reason why it could not
qualify as a memorandum of the con-
tract signed by the party to be charged."5
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In the absence of any such recital, the
will, whether it is a joint will, two
wills with reciprocal provisions, or an
individual will without any counter-
part executed by the promisee, is not a
memorandum of the contract." It is not
a sufficient memorandum because it con-
tains no words of contract. But in those
few courts where the mere execution of
joint or mutual wills having appropriate
reciprocal provisions is regarded as suffi-
cient evidence of the contract there is no
reason why such a will could not serve as
a sufficient memorandum. 8 And in view
of the Texas position on the evidentiary
question, the Kirk case could have been
placed squarely on that ground. There is
no assurance that this theory will be
adopted by the Texas Supreme Court. It
is hoped, however, that at its earliest op-
portunity the Court will either adopt this
or some other theory that will harmonize
the two apparently conflicting cases or
else will indicate which of the two is to be
followed in the future.
Conclusion
Joint wills are not suitable instruments
for any estate plan and their use is espe-
cially unwise in Texas, where there is
such a strong tendency to rely upon their
presence as evidence of a contract. No
useful purpose is served by having two
people execute the same document as the
will of each of them anyway except pos-
sibly the sentimental one of permitting a
husband and wife to exercise the appear-
ance of unity in the performance of this
particular chore. The uncertainty sur-
rounding their operation is a high price
to pay for such a limited amount of
sentimentality. Any concrete goals that
might be achieved through the use of
a joint will can be more satisfactorily
achieved with two separate wills hav-
ing similar reciprocal provisions. But
even here the intentions of the respec-
tive testators are likely to be frustrated
unless the wills are drafted with extreme
care. In the normal course of events a hus-
band and wife are likely to prepare and
execute their respective wills at or about
the same time under the supervision of
the same attorney. Each of them is likely
to make testamentary provision for the
other and the wills often include provi-
sions for identical dispositions upon the
death of the last to die. All this might be
done without any binding contractual ar-
rangement having entered the mind of
either party. But there is every indication
that the Texas courts will look upon the
similarity between the two wills and the
circumstances surrounding their execu-
tion as evidence of an enforceable obliga-
tion which might become very distasteful
to the surviving party and which was
never intended by either party.
But reciprocal provisions of the kind
described represent the normal and natur-
al desires of many testators. No lawyer
can avoid drafting such wills, and when
he does, he should always find out whether
or not the parties really intend to enter
into a contract concerning their testa-
mentary arrangements. If they do not, as
is probably the case in most instances, he
should include a clause in each of their
wills expressly stating that the testator is
aware of the will of the other party but
that the wills are not being executed pur-
suant to any contract of any kind and
that each party reserves the right to re-
voke his or her will with or without the
consent of the other party. In the un-
likely event that a contract is desired,
each will should contain a clause expressly
stating the terms of the contract. But the
inclusion of clauses of this kind should not
be allowed to conceal the fact that the
instruments being drafted are wills."9 In
each instance the clause concerning the
contract is nothing more than evidence
of a matter outside the will. It is the
testator's own declaration that he has or
has not entered into a collateral trans-
action. Such a unilateral declaration is
not conclusive evidence of the truth of the
thing declared. And if the declaration is
affirmative, that is to say, if there ac-
tually is a contract, the contract itself
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should be reduced to writing as a separate
document and signed by both parties. Pre-
cautions of this kind should help to avoid
expensive litigation and should go a long
way toward protecting testators from
having thrust upon them bargains they
never intended to make. In the meantime
it is to be hoped that the Texas Supreme
Court will re-examine its position con-
cerning the evidence necessary to prove
the existence of a contract to make a will.
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Property Management
(Continued from Page 280)
V. TAX CONSEQUENCES OF PARTI-
TION
(a) Tax consequences must be con-
sidered in connection with every partition
agreement but this subject is being treat-
ed by another speaker and Will therefore
not be covered in this portion of the pro-
gram.
VI. POWERS OF THE COURT IN DIVI-
SION OF THE ESTATE OF THE
PARTIES AND ITS EFFECT UPON
SETTLEMENT
(a) Statutory authority is contained in
Article 4638 which states, "The court pro-
nouncing a decree of divorce shall also
decree and order a division of the estate
of the parties in such a way as the court
shall deem just and right, having due re-
gard to the rights of each party and their
children, if any. Nothing herein shall be
construed to compel either party to divest
himself or herself of the title of real es-
tate." Hailey v. Hailey, 331 S.W. 2d 299
(Tex. 1959) now clarifies the last sen-
tence of Article 4638 to mean title to sep-
arate real estate.
(b) Considerations in determining di-
vision of the estate:
1. Relative fault of the parties.
2. Respective ages of the parties.
3. Health of the parties.
4. Earning capacity of each spouse.
5. Size of community estate.
6. Need of each party for future sup-
port.
7. Benefits the innocent spouse would
have received from continuation of the
marriage.
APRIL 1968
